Behind Defence Readiness: Can the UK Deliver the Infrastructure It Depends On?

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Defence readiness is usually discussed in terms of equipment, personnel and military capability. None of these operates in isolation. Behind them sits a wider system of infrastructure, industrial capacity, supply chains and delivery organisations that allows the UK to mobilise, operate and respond at scale. Whether that system can deliver at the speed now required is the question this article sets out to answer.

Funding matters, but funding alone does not create readiness. Without market capacity, specialist skills, prepared procurement routes, reliable information and clear decision-making, additional investment can struggle to translate into operational capability. As G&T’s work across defence and other major infrastructure sectors demonstrates, delivery capability is increasingly becoming part of national capability.

As Adam Earl, Partner and Defence sector specialist at G&T, puts it: “Funding doesn’t necessarily create readiness. You need the delivery capability behind it. That’s the people, the commercial arrangements and the supply chain to turn that investment into effective infrastructure delivery.”

Readiness is a national infrastructure question

This broader view of readiness is consistent with NATO’s approach to resilience. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires Allies to maintain their capacity to resist armed attack, underpinned by seven baseline requirements for civil preparedness: continuity of government, energy, population movement, food and water, mass casualties, communications and transport.

Defence is one of the UK’s 13 Critical National Infrastructure sectors, with each sector having significant dependencies on the others. Transport networks, ports, energy systems, manufacturing capacity, logistics hubs, data infrastructure and secure communications routinely serve civil and defence needs at the same time. A weakness or capacity constraint in one area can therefore have consequences well beyond the individual asset or sector.

For clients, this changes the question. It is no longer enough to ask whether an individual project can be delivered successfully. Increasingly, they also need to understand what that project depends on, where those dependencies may be vulnerable and whether sufficient capacity exists across the wider system.

Our work at HM Naval Base Portsmouth illustrates the point. Projects spanning heavy-lift capability, energy infrastructure and operational accommodation have been delivered inside a live naval environment. The challenge was never simply construction. It was integrating new capability while maintaining operational continuity and managing technical, security and heritage constraints at the same time.

The policy architecture has moved. Delivery must catch up

The strategic intent is now unusually clear. The 2025 Strategic Defence Review set the direction, and the Defence Industrial Strategy that followed designated defence a national growth sector, committed to compressing procurement timelines and placed resilience, surge capacity and wargaming with industry at the centre of policy. The National Armaments Director, in post since October 2025, now holds end-to-end responsibility for acquisition, with previously separate procurement budgets consolidated into one.

Procurement policy has moved with it. PPN 025, Protecting the UK’s National Security Through Public Procurement, asks contracting authorities to assess supply-chain vulnerability, market concentration and the consequences of disruption before they buy. In practice, that means a category manager at a defence organisation now needs evidence about the lower tiers of the market that most procurement processes were never designed to collect.

That is the delivery gap. The centre has been reorganised, the ambition is stated and the money is committed. What has not yet caught up is the capability of individual programmes to convert that into contracts, mobilised suppliers and assured infrastructure at the pace the policy assumes.

Mobilisation is decided before the crisis

If readiness describes the outcome, mobilisation is where the delivery system is tested. Speed depends on decisions, commercial arrangements and delivery systems established well in advance.

“You can’t go out and buy readiness when the crisis begins,” says Adam Earl. “Capacity, specialist skills and manufacturing capability are not things you can simply get overnight.”

Defence programmes carry complex requirements, multiple stakeholders and demanding assurance, all understandable given the environment. Time is lost in ways that are less defensible: over-specification at outline stage, approvals that sit with a single point in the chain, decisions reopened at each business-case gate, and market engagement that begins only once scope and budget are fixed. Moving faster does not require weaker governance. It requires clearer priorities, realistic baselines, defined decision authority and procurement routes matched to the level of urgency.

The commercial architecture deserves particular attention. Clients need to know which frameworks and call-off arrangements are available, where specialist suppliers sit, what long-lead constraints exist and whether existing contracts will support rapid mobilisation. None of this can be resolved once urgent demand has arrived.

Market engagement is therefore a practical component of readiness rather than a courtesy. Defence competes with energy, aviation, data centres and water for the same contractors, specialist trades and engineers. Where a regulated utility can show a supplier a five-year funded programme with repeat opportunities, defence too often offers a classified requirement and an unconfirmed budget. Suppliers allocate capacity accordingly.

Sean Hunter, G&T’s Defence & National Security sector lead, argues that clients need to remain visible to the market even where every funding decision has not yet been made. “No news is not good news for the supply chain. You need to stay active, share the pipeline where you can and give businesses enough confidence to make investment decisions.”

Sharing the pipeline is possible even where funding is not yet confirmed. Indicative demand signals by capability rather than by project, regular market days with a rolling forward look, early supplier questionnaires that build a picture of the sub-tier market, and honesty about what is and is not yet funded all give suppliers enough to plan around. Silence does not.

Resilient supply chains support sovereign capability

The binding constraints on a programme are rarely at tier one. They sit further down: a single UK source for large forgings or specialist castings, a handful of firms able to weld to nuclear or naval standards, one manufacturer of a radiological protection component with an eighteen-month replacement time, or a raw material sourced from a concentrated overseas market. Tier-one contractors manage these dependencies day to day; clients often only discover them when a delivery date moves.

Greater domestic capacity does not mean sourcing everything at home. The more useful question is where dependence creates unacceptable strategic risk and where international supply remains both appropriate and resilient.

Sean Hunter describes this as an issue of criticality rather than simple onshoring: “It doesn’t mean we need to make everything here. We need to understand what is critical, where the risks sit and what genuinely needs sovereign capability.”

That distinction matters because resilience has a cost. Dual sourcing, spare capacity and UK capability that is under-used in normal conditions all require funding, and in a constrained environment not every part of the system can be protected to the same degree. Recent public interventions to secure critical industrial capabilities show the state is prepared to act where the risk is clear. The task for programme clients is to produce the evidence that makes those calls possible: a map of where concentration, long-lead items and scarce skills sit, built before scope, programme and budget are fixed.

Commercial capability at scale is part of the answer. Through the Paragon joint venture, we provide contract management and procurement support across a significant portfolio of Defence Equipment and Support contracts, strengthening tendering, cost analysis and the identification of commercial risk. The purpose is not procurement as administration. It is commercial discipline that protects delivery dates.

Skills sit alongside this. Defence and other infrastructure sectors draw on a finite pool of specialist expertise, and some capabilities that were once stronger in the UK have thinned over time. A credible, visible pipeline is the single most effective tool a client must make defence work attractive to established suppliers, SMEs and people choosing careers in nuclear, advanced manufacturing and engineering.

Governing, measuring and assuring readiness

Preparation creates the conditions for mobilisation. Assurance tests whether those conditions will hold when circumstances change. Programmes should be able to answer a short set of questions at any time: how long it would take to mobilise; whether critical suppliers and skills are available; what the long-lead exposure is; how current the asset information is; how quickly decisions can be taken; and how fast essential operations could be restored after disruption.

These are readiness indicators, and they belong in programme governance alongside cost and schedule. The purpose is not additional reporting. It is to give decision-makers a clear view of where capability is robust, where assumptions need challenge and where investment should be prioritised.

Governance itself can become the constraint. Complex programmes require assurance, and it becomes counterproductive where responsibilities are unclear, approval routes are layered or decisions are repeatedly reopened. Effective governance provides challenge and accountability while allowing appropriately empowered people to act.

Data underpins all of this. Major programmes hold enormous quantities of cost, schedule, risk and operational information without necessarily connecting it. Technology and AI can help join those points and shorten feedback loops. They do not replace strong processes, reliable data, sound AI governance or experienced judgement. Our role as an integrator is to identify which data points matter across cost, programme, risk and commercial performance and turn them into insight that decision-makers can act on.

Project Bentham at HM Naval Base Portsmouth shows how readiness and value can be measured over the long term. We developed a Benefits Realisation Framework for a 20-year maritime infrastructure programme, establishing benefit definitions, accountability, performance indicators and reporting within the PMO. The result is a golden thread from business case through delivery into operation, so that success is judged not by whether projects are complete but by whether the intended capability is ready to perform.

How G&T helps: An independent view across the whole system

We hold no design, contracting or equipment interest in the programmes we advise on. That independence is the basis of our role: our advice on cost, commercial strategy and delivery is shaped only by the client’s required outcome. Our security-cleared teams work alongside delivery partners, consortium members and specialist SMEs, reflecting the reality that programmes of this scale need capacity from across the market.

We also work across both sides of the readiness equation. Our defence teams understand secure, complex and operational environments, while our work in transport, energy, industrial and other major programmes gives us direct visibility of the markets defence competes with, and of how other clients run pipeline visibility, market engagement, project controls and supply-chain management. That is where the transferable lessons sit.

The result is support that spans defining priorities and delivery requirements, setting up programmes that can mobilise at pace, aligning cost, programme, risk and benefits, strengthening procurement and supply-chain readiness, managing dependencies across complex portfolios, and measuring and assuring readiness.

Can the UK deliver?

The direction of policy since 2025 answers the question of intent. The infrastructure behind defence readiness - transport, energy, industrial capacity, communications, supply chains and delivery organisations - is now recognised as part of national capability, and NATO’s baseline resilience requirements give that recognition a framework.

The remaining test is delivery. Investment will only become readiness where programmes are prepared before they are needed, where commercial arrangements can mobilise the market at pace, where the lower tiers of the supply chain are understood rather than assumed, and where clients can evidence that critical systems will perform under physical or cyber disruption. Defence readiness is not simply a question of what the UK builds. It is whether the systems behind it are prepared, connected and assured to deliver when they are needed most.